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JACK M. BALKIN† 
INTRODUCTION1 
We are now well into America’s Second Gilded Age. The 
First Gilded Age was the era of industrial capitalism that 
began in the 1870s and 1880s and continued through the 
first years of the twentieth century, leading to the 
Progressive Era.2 It produced huge fortunes, political 
corruption, and vast inequalities of wealth, so much so that 
people became concerned that they would endanger 
American democracy. 
 
† Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment; Director, 
The Information Society Project, Yale Law School. This lecture is based on the 
2018 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture that I gave at the University of 
Buffalo School of Law on April 13, 2018. My thanks to the faculty of the 
University of Buffalo for the invitation and for their gracious hospitality. 
 1. The introduction to this article was adapted and revised for a blog post 
on the Law and Political Economy Blog. Jack M. Balkin, The Political Economy 
of Freedom of Speech in the Second Gilded Age, L. & POL. ECON., (July 4, 2018), 
https://lpeblog.org/2018/07/04/the-political-economy-of-freedom-of-speech-in-the-
second-gilded-age/. 
 2. On the First Gilded Age, see RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH 
IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE, 
1865–1896 (2017). 
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The Second Gilded Age begins, more or less, with the 
beginning of the digital revolution in the 1980s, but it really 
takes off in the early years of the commercial Internet in 
the 1990s, and it continues to the present day. It is 
characterized by the rise of social media and the 
development and implementation of algorithms, artificial 
intelligence, and robotics. For this reason I call our present 
era the Algorithmic Society. 
If the First Gilded Age is the age of industrial 
capitalism, the Second Gilded Age is the age of digital or 
informational capitalism. It too has produced great fortunes 
and led to concerns that increasing concentrations of wealth 
and economic inequality are endangering American 
democracy. Like the First Gilded Age, it is also a time of 
deep political corruption and despair about the future of 
American democracy. It has not yet given way to a second 
Progressive Era, but every day I see signs that this is where 
we are headed. 
There is a large literature criticizing the judicial 
doctrines of the First Amendment and how they are slanted 
toward the interests of corporations (and capital generally) 
in the Second Gilded Age.3 The most obvious examples are 
the federal courts’ recent decisions on commercial speech 
and campaign finance regulation.4 These are interesting 
 
 3. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 
51 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 323 (2016); Jeremy K. Kessler & 
David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1953 (2018); Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: Toward a 
Social-Democratic First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161 (2018); Amanda 
Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016); Tim Wu, The Right to 
Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, NEW 
REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), http://newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-
corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation. 
 4. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (holding that requiring nonmembers of public 
sector unions to pay fees toward collective bargaining violates the First 
Amendment); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2378 (2018) (striking down California law requiring pro-life pregnancy centers 
to provide certain factual information to patients); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 
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and important topics, but they are not the subject of today’s 
lecture. 
Instead, I want to focus on what we might call the 
political economy of free speech in the digital age. The basic 
question is this: How does our political and economic 
system pay for a digital public sphere? The answer is that it 
pays for it largely through digital surveillance and through 
finding new ways to make money out of personal data. 
Digital capitalism in the Second Gilded Age features an 
implicit bargain: a seemingly unlimited freedom to speak in 
exchange for the right to surveil and manipulate end-users. 
In this lecture I discuss the economic and political forces 
that shaped this bargain and their costs. I will use the 
recent scandal over Facebook’s privacy policies as an 
example of the problem. 
The First Amendment plays a role in this story, but not 
the role that you might expect. One of the interesting 
features of the digital age is that the protection of freedom 
of expression has begun to detach from the judicial 
doctrines of the First Amendment, so that, as interpreted 
by courts, the First Amendment is increasingly irrelevant to 
the protection of freedom of speech online.5 
 
2618, 2644 (2014) (striking down agency-fee provision of Illinois’s Public Labor 
Relations Act); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014) (striking down 
aggregate limits on federal campaign contributions); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754, 755 (2011) (striking down 
Arizona law providing “matching funds” to publicly funded state candidates 
when privately funded opponents spend over a certain amount); Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (striking down a Vermont law restricting 
the sale and disclosure of physicians’ prescription records); Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (striking down statutory limits on corporate 
electioneering). 
 5. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, 
Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1149, 1152 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society]; 
Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
427, 432–33, 443–44 (2009). See generally Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and 
Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information 
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19–22, 46–51 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital 
Speech and Democratic Culture]. 
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Why is that? Well, much of our practical ability to 
speak online depends on an infrastructure of digital 
communication—broadband companies, domain name 
registrars and registries, webhosting services, caching and 
security services, search engines, and social media 
companies. That infrastructure is owned and operated by 
private parties, not by the state. Thus, in most cases, the 
businesses that provide the digital infrastructure of free 
expression are not state actors bound by the First 
Amendment. If we want to protect people’s privacy and 
freedom of speech from overreaching by digital media 
companies, the First Amendment will not be our primary 
line of defense. Nor will the Fourth Amendment, or the rest 
of the Bill of Rights, for that matter. 
The First Amendment is relevant, but in a different 
way. It may be a potential obstacle to laws that try to 
regulate private infrastructure owners in order to protect 
end-users’ freedom of speech and privacy. One example 
would be the argument, rejected by the D.C. Circuit, but 
promoted by various corporations, that network neutrality 
regulations violate the free speech rights of broadband 
companies.6 
A second example would be an argument by social 
media companies that restricting how they use, distribute, 
or sell the consumer data that they collect in the course of 
their operations violates the First Amendment, because the 
data is speech or knowledge, and it is unconstitutional to 
 
 6. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and 
Communicating: Determining What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 
DUKE L.J. 1673, 1696–712 (2011) (considering First Amendment challenges to 
network neutrality and concluding that network neutrality rules and common 
carriage obligations in telecommunications law do not violate the First 
Amendment); Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 2343 (2014) (same). Compare United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 
F.3d 674, 740–44 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to 
network neutrality rules), reh’g denied, 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017), with id. 
at 426–35 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that FCC order violates the 
First Amendment). 
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restrict its use, sale, or distribution.7 The United States has 
not yet passed comprehensive digital privacy regulation, 
but when it attempts to, I expect that companies will make 
precisely this kind of argument against passage; and they 
will probably use the First Amendment to challenge any 
such legislation in the federal courts. 
In short, the First Amendment, as currently interpreted 
by federal courts, may be of little help in securing the 
practical ability to speak through the privately-owned 
digital infrastructure of communication; in some cases the 
judicially created doctrines of the First Amendment may 
even be a positive hindrance. 
That is why it is very important to distinguish the 
political value of freedom of speech from the judicially 
created doctrines of the First Amendment. To make the 
principles of the First Amendment live in our current age, 
we must look beyond the latest pronouncements of the 
federal courts. We must look at the political economy of 
digital speech. We must ask what dangers that political 
economy has created for end-users, and what kinds of 
reforms would best protect their interests. I’ve discussed a 
number of such reforms elsewhere;8 here I will focus on the 
duties of good faith and non-manipulation that 
infrastructure owners should have toward the people who 
use their facilities to communicate. 
The recent scandal over Facebook and Cambridge 
Analytica is a perfect example of these problems; you might 
 
 7. See IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. at 564–66 (applying “heightened judicial 
scrutiny” to Vermont’s law regulating prescription data because it made 
content- and speaker-based distinctions); U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 
1232–33 (10th Cir. 1999) (determining that restrictions on the sale of consumer 
data about telephone customers was a restriction on commercial speech because 
it interfered with telephone company’s ability to target customers for 
advertising purposes); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 
84–86 (2014) (explaining why the right to collect and create information 
suggests a broad right to record). 
 8. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 
(2018). 
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say that it is a characteristic scandal of the Second Gilded 
Age. That is because it revolves around how digital 
infrastructure companies make their money and how they 
affect the public sphere in the process. The scandal also 
reveals a basic problem of freedom of speech in the Second 
Gilded Age: Digital privacy undergirds our freedom of 
expression,9 but the way we pay for freedom of expression 
perpetually threatens our digital privacy. This is the irony 
of the digital era: An era that promised unbounded 
opportunities for freedom of expression is also an era of 
increasing digital control and surveillance. The same 
technological advances allow both results. 
I’ll use the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal to 
explain how the conditions that make free speech possible 
have changed from the twentieth to the twenty-first 
centuries. I will also use it to introduce one of the key 
concepts I’ve advocated for in previous work—the idea that 
digital media companies are information fiduciaries who 
have duties of care and loyalty toward their end-users.10 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AND 
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY MEDIA 
What are the characteristic differences between 
twentieth-century media and twenty-first-century media? 
The media that developed during the twentieth century 
(and that continue to this day) are primarily mass media—
newspapers, publishing houses, and broadcast media like 
radio, television and cable. Mass media feature a relatively 
small number of speakers who publish or transmit content 
to mass audiences. In mass communication, many people 
form the audience, but few get to participate as speakers. 
Thus, its basic structure is few-to-many. There have always 
 
 9. See generally NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015). 
 10. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016). 
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been exceptions of course: telephone communication is one-
to-one. Ham radio equipment allows people with relatively 
little money to broadcast. But for the most part, the 
twentieth-century’s dominant media were closed to the vast 
majority of people who wanted to publish or broadcast their 
own content. 
A second important feature of twentieth-century-style 
media is that the publishers, broadcasters, and movie 
studios produce most of the content they publish or 
broadcast, or else contract with a relatively small number of 
people and businesses to provide content. The business of 
mass media is not to publish the content of the vast 
majority of ordinary citizens—rather, the latter form their 
audience, not their content providers. That’s why mass 
communication industries developed with various 
specialties: producers, directors, editors, actors, 
announcers, entertainers, and so on. 
By contrast, twenty-first-century media are organized 
differently. They do not assume that only a small number of 
people will speak to a vast audience. Communication is not 
only one-to-many or few-to-many. It is also many-to-many. 
Everyone can participate in twenty-first-century 
communications media. This makes them more like 
telephones, but with an important difference. Instead of 
communicating with one other person, people can 
communicate with an indefinite number of people. They can 
also engage in mass communication. They can also be 
broadcasters. 
The promise of twenty-first-century media is what I 
have called a democratic culture—a culture of mass 
participation rather than the culture of mass audiences 
that characterized the twentieth century.11 Everyone can, 
in theory, participate in mass communication, and everyone 
can have access to media that, in theory, could be viewed or 
 
 11. See Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 5, at 9–
12. 
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read by people around the world, even if, in practice, not 
everyone is interested in everything that everyone else has 
to say. People can address themselves to a small number of 
people, but they can also speak to an indefinite public. 
The media companies of the early twenty-first century 
are also different from those that arose in the early to mid-
twentieth century. Their primary business is not 
broadcasting their own content or the content of a small 
number of business partners. Rather, their job is to 
transmit or serve as a platform for everyone’s content, and 
their business models actively encourage mass 
participation. Very few people got to write for the 
twentieth-century version of the New York Times. But 
everyone can post on Facebook, and, moreover, Facebook 
wants you to post, as often as possible. Google wants you to 
create as many webpages as you like so that it can index 
them. Pinterest and Instagram want you to post lots of 
photos, Twitter wants you to tweet to your heart’s content, 
and so on. 
How to pay for the public sphere 
The political economy of freedom of speech concerns, 
among other things, how to pay for a system of free 
expression in a given technological and social context. 
Despite the name, a system of free expression is not itself 
free; it requires investments in capital and infrastructure, 
particular forms of labor (and skills), and a set of social 
practices that interact with the communications technology 
of the time. 
This question—how to pay for a robust sphere of public 
discourse—is at the heart of the Facebook/Cambridge 
Analytica scandal. That is because the scandal emerged 
from how Facebook finances its platform for social 
communication. Facebook makes its money primarily 
through selling advertising, matching advertisers with end-
users. It performs this matching by collecting, processing, 
and analyzing data about its end-users. Now if end-users 
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aren’t on Facebook, they won’t see those ads, so it’s 
important to make sure that end-users remain online as 
much as possible. To this end, Facebook also uses the same 
data to curate its feeds, trying to come up with ever new 
ways to entice its end-users to stay on the site and give 
Facebook ever more of their attention. 
Twentieth-century media was paid for by a combination 
of advertising, sales of media goods, and subscription fees. 
Newspaper companies sold individual newspapers on 
newsstands and in stores; they sold subscriptions; and they 
also sold advertising space. Broadcasters were in a 
somewhat different position. Because, until very recently, 
all broadcast radio was free, radio stations made money 
primarily through selling ads. Book publishers got most of 
their money from the purchases of books, and in some 
cases, through subscription services like book-of-the-month 
clubs. Relatively little money came from advertising within 
books, although magazines often have lots of 
advertisements that help pay for the costs of publication. 
Cable companies made money through a combination of 
subscriptions, pay-per-view, and advertising. 
If a company depends on advertising, it’s very 
important to place the ads in front of people who might 
want to buy the products. But in the twentieth century, 
advertising could not be easily or precisely targeted at the 
individual level. One could do a bit of targeting— 
magazines, for example, appeal to different audiences, as do 
radio stations that specialize in certain kinds of music. 
Advertisers who wanted to reach people interested in sports 
or in fashion might advertise in Sports Illustrated or Elle, 
respectively. 
Yet general-interest newspapers did not want to appeal 
to specialized audiences like magazines or radio stations 
did because they relied heavily on classified 
advertisements, and so they wanted to appeal to the widest 
possible audience. The desire for the broadest possible 
audience limited their strategies for targeted advertising. 
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Some twentieth-century media attempted to target 
advertisements, but the techniques were not very precise, 
and aimed mostly at large demographic categories. Other 
media actively sought general audiences and therefore 
found targeting counterproductive, although the ads might 
be directed at those consumers most likely to purchase 
goods—for example, the fabled 18–49 demographic. 
These are the business models that financed twentieth-
century media, and hence financed the system of free 
expression, and the creation of a robust public sphere with 
diverse and antagonistic sources of information and 
opinion. The economic structure of twentieth-century media 
shaped what kind of public sphere we would have. 
We are in a different world now. But in this new world, 
the same basic problems remain. What business models 
make it possible for an economy to produce a robust public 
sphere of discussion and debate? How do we ensure diverse 
and antagonistic sources of information and opinion? How 
do we finance the kind of public sphere that is necessary for 
democracy, whether political democracy, or, as in my own 
theory of the First Amendment, cultural democracy? 
It is entirely possible that we won’t be able to finance 
the kind of digital public sphere that is best for political or 
cultural democracy. After all, the public sphere produced by 
the twentieth-century media ecology was skewed in many 
different ways; it had its own blind spots and biases. 
The quality of the digital public sphere will depend in 
part on the business models of twenty-first-century media 
companies: Facebook, Google, YouTube, Twitter, Pinterest, 
and Instagram, are the most well-known examples. These 
companies originally didn’t think of themselves as media 
companies at all, but rather as technology companies. 
Gradually, they came to understand that they were the 
most important players in the digital public sphere, and 
that, in different ways, they acted as gatekeepers, as 
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newspapers and broadcast stations had in the twentieth 
century.12 These digital companies, in short, discovered that 
they were media companies whether they liked it or not.13 
The twentieth-century public sphere depended heavily 
on for-profit business models. Is there any alternative? One 
way of avoiding dependence on for-profit business models 
would be to turn to public provisioning. Some nations have 
national broadcasters, for example, the BBC in Great 
Britain, or the CBC in Canada.14 Some countries also have 
state-owned newspapers, although this is somewhat rarer 
in Western democracies.15 
The government could own and run the broadband 
system within a country. It’s certainly possible to have 
municipal wifi, although broadband companies have done 
their best to try to prevent it in the United States. One 
could also create a nationalized social media company—a 
sort of public option to Facebook and Twitter. One could 
even have a nationalized search engine—because one can’t 
have an effective system of digital communication without 
search engines. 
Nationalization of search engines and social media has 
been less frequent in Western democracies, partly due to 
the enormous startup costs for each country. Moreover, at 
least in the United States, a national search engine that 
made decisions about which links to prioritize and which to 
demote, or a government social media company that 
imposed the kinds of civility rules that Facebook and 
 
 12. See Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 
1180–81. 
 13. Id. at 1181. 
 14. Who We Are: At a Glance, Linked to Inside the BBC, BBC, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/corporate2/insidethebbc/whoweare/ataglance (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018); Who We Are, What We Do: Canadian, CBC, http://www.cbc.radio-
canada.ca/en/explore/who-we-are-what-we-do/canadian/ (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018). 
 15. See Simeon Djankov et al., Who Owns the Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341, 
363 (2003). 
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Twitter employ, might raise serious problems under the 
First Amendment—unless all of its activities could be 
classified as government speech.16 In China, however, there 
are close links between the government and the largest 
search engine Baidu, and between the government and the 
dominant social media companies, all of whom cooperate 
with the central government’s requests for surveillance and 
censorship.17 That, of course, is because the Chinese 
government wants to regulate and surveil its citizens’ 
speech far more than Western democracies would tolerate.18 
In the United States, as in many other places in the 
world, the Internet infrastructure is not owned by the 
government. Broadband companies, wifi companies, search 
engines, and social media platforms are privately owned. 
That means that the digital public sphere is not publicly 
provisioned. It has to turn a profit. 
How do these companies make money? For basic 
Internet services—such as broadband companies, 
webhosting services, storage services, and domain name 
registries and registrars—the answer has generally been 
subscription, as it was for twentieth-century media like 
telephones and cable television. 
But for search engines and social media platforms, the 
business model has largely been driven by advertising. 
Moreover, twenty-first-century technology made it possible 
to engage in targeted advertising of individuals in ways 
that were never possible in the twentieth century. 
 
 16. Compare Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015) (holding that government may make content distinctions 
with respect to its own speech), with Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 
2218, 2231 (2015) (holding that content based regulations of private speech are 
subject to strict scrutiny). 
 17. Social Media and Censorship in China: How Is It Different to the West?, 
BBC (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/41398423/social-
media-and-censorship-in-china-how-is-it-different-to-the-west. 
 18. Id. 
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THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF FREE EXPRESSION IS THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE OF SURVEILLANCE 
Individualized targeting becomes possible because 
everything that people do online produces (or can produce) 
recordable data—the location of their computer or phone, 
the answers they give to quizzes, the goods they purchase, 
the sites they visit, the people they contact, the files they 
download, even their keystrokes. Every action in cyberspace 
is potentially recordable; it is just a matter of whether the 
recording is implemented and the data is stored. Companies 
can use all of this data to construct social graphs of 
individuals: who they talk to, who their friends are, what 
sites they visit, what they purchase, what they like and 
dislike, and so on. This also allows the construction of 
metadata and digital dossiers about individuals, which, in 
turn, assist companies (and governments) in forming 
judgments and predictions about them. 
This degree of data surveillance and inference was not 
really possible in the twentieth century. For example, if you 
purchased a paperback book, the publisher could not tell 
whether you had actually read the book. But with Kindle 
applications, Amazon can tell how far you have read in a 
book and how long it took you. Your reading habits are 
traceable. 
One can generalize this point. Almost every new media 
application of the early twenty-first century is both a 
method of communication and a method of surveillance. 
Twenty-first-century media offer ever more precise methods 
for surveilling and predicting the behavior of their end-
users and the people those end-users communicate with. 
Nor is that all. We are rapidly moving into a world 
dominated by the Internet of Things and personal robots. In 
the Internet of Things, every appliance, indeed, every 
possession, can, in theory, reveal information about its 
owners and operators. People don’t even have to 
communicate with other human beings to be surveilled. A 
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whole new generation of applications and appliances are 
devoted to getting you to talk to them: Siri, Alexa, Cortana, 
and their friends really want to know what you think. 
There is an ironic similarity to the world of Downton 
Abbey, the BBC series about British nobility in the first 
part of the twentieth century and their relationships with 
their servants. The butlers, valets, maids, and footmen are 
always standing by ready to serve the nobility. They are 
always present, and they don’t say anything unless they are 
spoken to, but they are always listening. There is a well-
known saying that “No man is a hero to his own valet.” I 
would say that no one is a hero to Siri or Alexa. 
A twentieth-century radio station could not surveil its 
listeners, and a twentieth-century television could not 
surveil its viewers—unless they agreed to be a Nielsen 
family. With cable television, however, it became possible to 
have limited forms of surveillance, and so it is no surprise 
that Congress passed an early form of privacy legislation to 
govern cable.19 
By contrast, in twenty-first-century media, surveillance 
is the norm rather than the exception. Everything becomes 
traceable, and the possibilities for surveillance explode. 
Even if firms only collect very basic metadata—whom end-
users contacted, what sites they visited, and for how long—
firms can still can generate a great deal of information 
about their end-users and those they communicate with. 
With sufficient computing power and computer storage, 
companies can analyze this data and make judgments. But 
a further characteristic of the digital age is that over time 
the cost of computation and the cost of storage become ever 
more inexpensive, thus, facilitating new forms of 
surveillance, analysis, and prediction. 
Surveillance, data collection, and data analysis are, by 
 
 19. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 
Stat. 2779 (1984). 
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now, central to the twenty-first-century media ecology and, 
for that matter, to twenty-first-century capitalism. 
Surveillance, data collection, and data analysis fund key 
aspects of the digital infrastructure—as well as many other 
applications and services. This means that the 
infrastructure of freedom of expression—the infrastructure 
that you use to communicate with your friends and 
relatives, the infrastructure that you use to post your cat 
videos, the infrastructure that you use to post pictures of 
your vacation so that all of your friends will be jealous of 
you, the infrastructure that you use to post your 
engagement announcements or your birthday celebration—
is also the infrastructure that companies use to surveil you 
and to record your movements, contacts, habits, likes, and 
dislikes. The two are one and the same. 
The infrastructure of digital free expression is the 
infrastructure of digital surveillance. 
Once again, the government could provide all of this 
infrastructure—from broadband to social networks to 
search engines—and fund it with tax revenues or deficit 
spending. But in that case, the infrastructure of free 
expression would be the infrastructure of government 
surveillance. As it is, the government repeatedly seeks to 
harness the technologies of private surveillance for its own 
ends. If the government owned the infrastructure, it could 
eliminate the middle man. It could collect enormous 
amounts of data about people’s habits, locations, and 
preferences simply by operating social media and search 
engines, which it could then analyze to make predictions 
about people’s likely behavior. The Fourth Amendment 
would provide little restraint, because, by hypothesis, 
people willingly offer data about themselves in order to use 
the government-provided service. 
Therefore, to the extent that one turns to government 
provisioning as an alternative to private companies, it will 
be necessary to have extremely strong safeguards against 
the collection, collation, and analysis of data willingly given 
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to government infrastructure providers. Put more bluntly, 
politicians, law enforcement officials, and bureaucrats alike 
would have to have the political will to prevent the 
government (and themselves) from collecting all that data 
and using it. I think it is very unlikely that government 
actors will be able to restrain themselves. 
Failing the development of a public option, then, the 
current system primarily involves a system of private 
digital surveillance, which both private entities and 
governments seek to harness for their own ends. 
The grand bargain of twenty-first-century media looks 
like this: Privately-owned infrastructure companies will 
provide you with many different valuable services. They 
will provide you with a search engine that is nothing short 
of miraculous—that allows you to find anything you want 
virtually instantaneously. They will provide you with social 
media that allow you to publish and express almost 
anything your heart could desire. Indeed, they will 
encourage you to publish and to communicate with others, 
repeatedly and incessantly. End-users get all of these 
services, all of this stuff—and they get it all for free. And in 
return, media owners get to collect their data, analyze it, 
and use it to predict, control, and nudge what end-users do. 
It is theoretically possible that search engines and 
social media sites could forsake data collection and analysis 
by forsaking advertising revenue. They could move to a 
subscription service—that is how broadband and DNS 
registries operate. We have already seen this business 
model in operation with various streaming services such as 
Spotify, Pandora, Hulu, and Netflix. These companies offer 
a combination of subscription and free services that are 
paid for by data surveillance. Yet it’s important to recognize 
that even if social media companies offered tiered services 
like Spotify and Pandora—that is, free services plus 
subscription services—there is no reason to think that the 
result would be less surveillance of the people who pay for 
the subscriptions. Subscribers might get fewer ads in their 
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feeds, but their social graph and personal data might be 
just as valuable to the company and to its business 
partners. 
In any case, a subscription model has disadvantages for 
social media companies because it might produce a far 
smaller user base, and therefore less interesting and 
intriguing content that would keep end-users coming back 
for more. By contrast, Facebook’s existing business model of 
free services in exchange for data surveillance leads it to try 
to get as many people as possible to join Facebook, to visit 
the site as often as possible, to engage with the site as often 
as possible, and spend as much time on the site as possible. 
The twentieth-century model of broadcast media and 
mass media was a model of scarcity of media access; not 
everyone got to publish in the New York Times or broadcast 
on CBS. The scarcity of twenty-first-century media is the 
scarcity of attention—the scarcity of eyeballs.20 To continue 
to grow—and thus continue to please its shareholders—
Facebook has two choices. First, it can attempt to increase 
the total number of end-users. Facebook already has some 
two billion users in a world of seven billion potential 
customers.21 Second, Facebook can grow by finding ever 
new ways to get its end-users to spend more and more time 
on the site. The second strategy dominates over time, and 
this is why, as Tim Wu has explained, social media sites 
like Facebook try to addict you—to engage you and keep 
 
 20. See Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich 
World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40 
(Martin Greenberger ed., 1971) (“[A] wealth of information creates a poverty of 
attention . . . .”); ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND 
FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST 271 (2017); Balkin, Digital Speech and 
Democratic Culture, supra note 5, at 7 (“The digital revolution made a different 
kind of scarcity salient. It is not the scarcity of bandwidth but the scarcity of 
audiences, and, in particular, scarcity of audience attention.”). 
 21. Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 2nd Quarter 
2018 (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810 
/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
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you coming back for more, and more, and more.22 The 
theoretical limit for a company like Facebook is all seven 
billion people in the world spending twenty-four hours a 
day on Facebook—unless, somehow, they get the folks on 
Alpha Centauri to sign up. 
THREE PROBLEMS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY MODEL 
The implicit bargain of twenty-first-century media 
capitalism produces three interrelated issues: the problem 
of private governance, the problem of new-school speech 
regulation, and the problem of private surveillance. I have 
already written a great deal about the first two,23 and so I 
will only mention them in passing. 
Private governance 
The first set of issues concern how social media govern 
us and the spaces we use to communicate with each other. 
The problems of social media governance are manipulation 
on the one hand, and arbitrariness and non-transparency 
on the other. 
First, social media curate and shape what we 
experience on their sites. For example, people get 
personalized feeds on Facebook—they don’t get all possible 
posts of Facebook friends in the order in which they were 
posted. Rather, Facebook tries to decide which posts will be 
most engaging—most compulsive, interesting, and 
 
 22. TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE 
OUR HEADS 289–302 (2016) (describing how social media companies attempt to 
attract advertisers by cornering the market on attention and addicting 
customers); Tim Wu, Subtle and Insidious, Technology Is Designed to Addict Us, 
WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/subtle-and-insidious-
technology-is-designed-to-addict-us/2017/03/02/5b983ef4-fcee-11e6-99b4-9e613a 
feb09f_story.html?utm_term=.74b2a3a0012f (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (“[F]or 
a product like Facebook, success and user addiction are the same thing.”). 
 23. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 5; Jack M. 
Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2296 
(2014) [hereinafter Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation]. 
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addictive.24 It also tries to organize the order of posts to 
make them more interesting and entertaining. Facebook 
may also include posts or items from people who are not 
one’s Facebook friends in order to create an entertaining, 
engaging, and absorbing—some would say addictive—
experience.25 This creates a potential conflict of interest: 
social media companies have natural incentives to 
manipulate and even addict their end-users to increase 
their profits. 
Second, because social media companies encourage as 
many people as possible to use their sites, the inevitable 
result is incivility, trolling, and abuse. Digital media create 
both a sense of immediacy and a sense of distance between 
people; when this happens, some end-users will behave in 
ways that they would be ashamed to behave when 
confronting others face to face. Social media sites therefore 
have to take on the role of governors, enforcing civility 
norms and policing for threats, abuse, and harassment. 
In this way, as Kate Klonick has argued, social media 
companies become governors of their spaces, and not merely 
facilitators of communication.26 Social media companies 
spend an increasing amount of their time policing their 
sites and deciding when and whether to take things down; 
and when social media companies remove posts, suspend 
users, or ban them, their operations are usually not 
 
 24. See, e.g., Victor Luckerson, Here’s How Facebook’s News Feed Actually 
Works, TIME (July 9, 2015), http://time.com/collection-post/3950525/facebook-
news-feed-algorithm/ (“[M]ost users see only a sliver of the potential posts in 
their network each day.”). 
 25. Paul Lewis, ‘Our Minds Can Be Hijacked’: The Tech Insiders Who Fear a 
Smartphone Dystopia, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2017, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/05/smartphone-addiction-
silicon-valley-dystopia (interviewing former employees at Google and Facebook 
who report that technologies are designed to addict users and monopolize their 
attention). 
 26. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1635–48 (2018) (describing 
bureaucracies at Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter). 
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transparent and offer little in the way of procedural due 
process.27 
New-school speech regulation 
A second issue is what I call “new-school” speech 
regulation. In more traditional, or “old-school” speech 
regulation, states aim at speakers and twentieth-century 
publishers and mass media. In “new-school” speech 
regulation, states aim at owners of digital infrastructure in 
order to get them to control or censor online speakers who 
may be too numerous, difficult to locate, anonymous, or 
outside the country.28 New-school speech regulation, in 
other words, is the state’s attempt to harness private 
infrastructure owners’ growing capacity to surveil and 
govern the people who use the infrastructure, and to turn 
these capacities to the state’s purposes. Examples are the 
European Union’s “right to be forgotten,”29 and the E.U.’s 
new digital hate speech rules—which involve agreements 
with the big four media companies.30 
Just as states try to use private infrastructure to block 
or censor speech, they also try to use it to assist them with 
surveillance.31 Data flows continuously through digital 
companies’ facilities, creating ever more data and 
 
 27. Id. at 1648. 
 28. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 1175; 
Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 23, at 2298. 
 29. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 91; Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary 
Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the 
Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 986 (2018). 
 30. See Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, 
STATEWATCH, https://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/sep/eu-com-illegal-content-
online-code-of-conduct.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2018); Countering Illegal Hate 
Speech Online #NoPlace4Hate, EUR. COMMISSION (July 11, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=54300 
[https://perma.cc/L29F-3YGP]. 
 31. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 23, at 
2297. 
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metadata. All of this is especially intriguing to nation-
states, who would like to make judgments and predictions, 
to locate and identify people, and to trace and predict 
crimes and national security threats.32 The information 
collected by infrastructure owners becomes a tempting 
target for nation-states—ever more tempting as 
infrastructure providers become better and better at 
collecting and analyzing this sort of information. Call this 
the problem of public surveillance.33 
Private surveillance 
The third problem—which brings us to the 
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal—is not the problem 
of state surveillance, but the problem of private 
surveillance. According to the grand bargain of surveillance 
capitalism, Facebook, Google and other media businesses 
offer free or heavily subsidized services in exchange for 
subjecting end-users to ever more effective ways of 
collecting and analyzing data that people produce whenever 
they interact with their sites. The goal is to turn this 
resource into money. Companies achieve this goal through 
private surveillance, data collection, and analysis—and by 
either selling end-users to advertisers, or else selling the 
data to others. 
A familiar saying in the industry is that Big Data is the 
New Oil.34 Data is a resource that is there for the taking—
just as pools of oil were just lying under the surface before 
the Industrial Revolution. 
If entrepreneurs like John D. Rockefeller could figure 
 
 32. Id. at 1155–57. 
 33. See id. at 2304–06, 2320, 2329–30 (explaining why private 
infrastructure is a tempting target for governments). 
 34. Jonathan Vanian, Why Data Is the New Oil, FORTUNE (July 12, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/07/11/data-oil-brainstorm-tech; see Michael Palmer, 
Data Is the New Oil, ANA MARKETING MAESTROS (Nov. 3, 2006, 5:43 AM), 
http://ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html. 
1000 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
out how to take that oil and refine it and sell it to other 
people, they could finance industrial capitalism and make a 
fortune in the process. In the same way, everyone leaves 
traces of themselves and their activities—data—whenever 
they use digital devices and wherever they go on the 
Internet, and if somebody can just figure out how to collect 
it, and refine it, and analyze it, harness it to make 
calculations and predictions, or sell it to others to make 
calculations and predictions, they can drive modern digital 
capitalism—that is, surveillance capitalism—and they can 
make a fortune in the process. 
WORKING FOR THE MAN 
Just as industrial capitalism made great fortunes, so 
too has digital capitalism. Instead of Rockefeller, and 
Vanderbilt, and Carnegie, we have Gates, and Zuckerberg, 
and Brin, and Schmidt. Just as poorly paid workers in lousy 
working conditions contributed to the fortunes of the First 
Gilded Age, so everyone, at home or at work, in pajamas or 
in business attire, contributes to the fortunes of the Second 
Gilded Age. We are all working for the Man. 
All of us are workers in data factories, whether we 
know it or not. Every time you click on a link in Google, 
every time you visit Facebook, every time you post on 
Twitter, every time you upload a cat video on YouTube, you 
are working for the Man. 
Not Vanderbilt, Alphabet. Not Rockefeller, Zuckerberg. 
This phenomenon is twenty-first-century capitalism’s 
appropriation and reconfiguration of open-source or peer-
production methods, described and theorized in the early 
2000s by Yochai Benkler.35 Benkler described how Linux 
developers and Wikipedia created valuable information 
goods through peer-production, with relatively little 
 
 35. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). 
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investment in bureaucracies and management 
hierarchies.36 Where Benkler saw possibilities for freer, 
more participatory, and less coercive methods of business 
organization and peer production, digital capitalists have 
seen ways of saving money by reorganizing unpaid labor 
and collecting data about end-users in order to produce 
greater profits. This penguin is spying on you, collecting 
your data, and waddling all the way to the bank. 
All end-users contribute to the production of an 
information good—the social media site—and its source of 
wealth, that is, data. People visit Facebook and create data; 
they like or dislike posts and create data; they post new 
content and create data; and they attract others to the site 
to read or view what they have posted. Even when you see 
something you don’t like on Twitter or Facebook, you are 
still working for the Man. Perhaps somebody made a racist 
or abusive comment. You click a button to report the tweet 
or post, or you send a message arguing that such-and-such 
a post or comment is in violation of the company’s terms of 
service. Even then, you are still working for the Man. Why? 
Because the site needs an army of people to discover when 
others violate its terms of service or community policies, 
and you are helping provide that service.37 And in return, 
what do you get? Not a salary. You get a free service in 
which your data—and those of your friends and relatives—
is used to keep you coming back to the site, and to sell you 
to advertisers and business partners. 
That is why, although people say that Data is the New 
Oil, I like to say that Data is Soylent Green.38 As Charlton 
 
 36. Id. at 60, 64–67, 70–73. 
 37. Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the Internet, VERGE 
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internet-moderator-
history-youtube-facebook-reddit-censorship-free-speech (“[U]sers are not so much 
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being used and capitalized).”). 
 38. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 1154–57. 
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Heston reminds us, Soylent Green is people.39 You are your 
data, and that data is the raw material of digital 
capitalism. In the political economy of the early twenty-first 
century, your data is the price of your freedom of 
expression. 
As noted above, digital media companies like Facebook 
are always trying to find new ways to squeeze money out of 
this raw material. One way to make money is to let other 
people use the social graph of end-users. Businesses can 
create applications which they can either place on 
Facebook’s site itself, or they can use Facebook’s login as 
their entry to the application. Once the end-user signs in to 
Facebook, the third party can gain access to their social 
graph—and, in some cases, the social graph of their 
Facebook friends—and use that data to provide services, do 
market research, sell advertisements, predict behavior, and 
so on. Facebook, in turn, can take a cut of the profits from 
the business.40 This was Facebook’s approach in its initial 
years, and although it has modified its business practices 
over the years, it is also the approach of many other digital 
companies that collect your data and share it with third 
parties. 
Facebook has also provided pro bono access to scientific 
researchers, who could download personal data to engage in 
scientific studies.41 This strategy doesn’t make Facebook 
 
 39. SOYLENT GREEN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 1973); BradZ1, IT’S 
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https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/20/facebook-data-cambridge-
analytica-sandy-parakilas (explaining that under the policy, “‘a majority of 
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 41. See id.; James Sanders & Dan Patterson, Facebook Data Privacy 
Scandal: A Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC (Oct. 25, 2018) 
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money directly, but it enhances its connections with data 
scientists around the world. 
This is essentially what happened in the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal. Aleksandr Kogan, a data scientist, used 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to find people who were willing 
to take a personality quiz for a dollar.42 Mechanical Turk 
organizes the labor of strangers by offering them small 
amounts of money to perform particular tasks. This is 
another example of how money-making enterprises have 
adapted distributed peer-production systems for their own 
purposes. 
People who took the quiz signed in to Facebook with 
their username and password. This, in turn, gave Kogan 
access to the Facebook data associated with the people 
answering the quiz, as well as the data of all of their 
Facebook friends, a practice that was apparently 
permissible under Facebook’s then-existing data sharing 
policies.43 This is how approximately 300,000 users allowed 
Kogan access to the data of some 87 million people.44 Under 
such a regime, the more popular a person is—the more 
Facebook friends they have—the more valuable they are to 
the company and its partners. 
But Kogan wasn’t simply a data scientist. He was also 
 
 42. Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, How Cambridge 
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in cahoots with Cambridge Analytica.45 Thus, he 
misrepresented himself to Facebook. He participated in 
Facebook’s platform policy for researchers and scientists, 
but he turned over the data to Cambridge Analytica, a for-
profit political consulting company that uses personal data 
to serve targeted political ads based on psychological 
profiles.46 
INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES 
This led to a scandal. But what exactly is the nature of 
this scandal? We should distinguish its various parts. One 
aspect is foreign participation in American elections in 
violation of federal campaign finance laws. Cambridge 
Analytica is a U.K. political consulting firm and employs 
many people who are not American citizens.47 
A second aspect—targeted political ads—is not really 
much of a scandal. Political ads are core protected speech 
under the First Amendment. And political ads do not lose 
their First Amendment projection simply because they are 
targeted. 
Targeted political ads—saying one thing to one group of 
people and another to another group of people—is as 
American as apple pie, or more correctly as apple pie to one 
group of Americans and cherry pie to another group. 
Indeed, ever more precise targeting of political 
advertisements is the wave of the future, if the future has 
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not already arrived.48 To make targeting effective, of course, 
political operatives will need to know more and more about 
voters, which means that they will need lots of data about 
them, which means that they will either have to collect the 
data themselves or purchase it from others. Hence, digital 
capitalism predictably leads to new forms of political 
surveillance—political in the sense that it is operated by 
and for political parties, candidates, and their campaigns. 
This is the model of the political organization as 
database49—the organization of politics around the same 
techniques that digital companies have already mastered to 
advertise products, just as earlier political operatives copied 
and mastered the techniques of Madison Avenue and 
twentieth-century advertisers.50 
A third aspect of the scandal is most important for 
purposes of this lecture. The problem was not the revelation 
that Facebook had entered into an unusual business 
arrangement with a single company. The true scandal was 
that giving third parties access to personal data, and using 
personal data to manipulate people, were ordinary, run-of-
the-mill business practices. Facebook’s dealings with 
Cambridge Analytica were the tip of a very large iceberg.51 
Understood in this way, the Cambridge Analytical 
scandal went to the heart of the grand bargain that pays for 
the digital public sphere. It laid bare a central problem of 
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our age: how to preserve the benefits of a freely accessible 
online public sphere while preventing digital companies 
from abusing their roles as collectors, analyzers, and users 
of personal data. 
In order to do this, we have to rethink the role that 
digital companies play in our lives, borrow some old ideas 
from the law of the professions, and apply them to the 
twenty-first-century companies who collect, analyze and use 
our personal data for profit. 
The central idea is this: We should regard the digital 
media companies who collect and use our personal data as 
information fiduciaries toward their end-users.52 Because 
they are information fiduciaries, they have special duties of 
care, confidentiality, and loyalty toward their end-users.53 
Many of the biggest players in the Second Gilded Age—
Facebook, Twitter, Google and Microsoft—are information 
fiduciaries. 
What makes these companies information fiduciaries? 
People increasingly depend on these companies to perform 
services for them. The companies know a great deal about 
their end-users, and they can use that knowledge in many 
ways, but their end-users know next to nothing about their 
internal operations.54 As a result, their end-users are 
especially vulnerable to these companies, and they have to 
trust that the companies will not abuse them, betray them, 
or manipulate them to increase the company’s profit 
margins. 
These four features of the situation—(1) the company 
provides special services based on special expertise; (2) 
there is a great asymmetry in knowledge between the 
company and its clients; (3) clients are especially vulnerable 
to the company because of the company’s knowledge about 
 
 52. Balkin, supra note 10, at 1221. 
 53. Id. at 1207–08. 
 54. Id. at 1224–25. 
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them; and (4) the need for clients to trust the company to 
receive the benefit of the service—are standard reasons why 
the law recognizes fiduciary relationships.55 
The law has long understood that special relationships 
of vulnerability and trust require special fiduciary 
obligations.56 Examples are professionals like doctors, 
lawyers, and estate managers.57 Each of them gains special 
information about their clients that could easily be used to 
their clients’ disadvantage. For this reason, law requires 
them to act as fiduciaries toward their clients, with special 
duties of care, good faith, loyalty, and non-manipulation.58 
A new class of fiduciaries has emerged in the Second 
Gilded Age. These new fiduciaries are the digital companies 
that perform a wide range of individualized services for us 
in return for the collection and monetization of our data. 
Social media and search engine companies in particular are 
among these new information fiduciaries of the digital age. 
For example, Facebook provides an important service—
a social network—that many people find not only valuable 
but indispensable. In the course of providing that service, 
people provide enormous amounts of data about 
themselves, making them (and their friends and loved ones) 
ever more vulnerable to Facebook. Their lives become 
transparent to Facebook, but Facebook’s operations are not 
transparent to them. They have to trust that Facebook will 
not use its special knowledge and abilities to abuse them or 
manipulate them for its own profit and advantage. 
Facebook’s right to hold and use personal data, in other 
words, depends on its fiduciary duty not to take advantage 
of its end-users’ vulnerability. It has a duty not to abuse the 
trust that vulnerable end-users must place in Facebook in 
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order for the company to provide its services. As Mark 
Zuckerberg himself has said, if the company abuses that 
trust, “we don’t deserve” to have your data.59 
This fiduciary duty arises out of a contractual 
relationship—the terms of service or end-user license 
agreement—that digital companies require of their end-
users. But duties of an information fiduciary are not limited 
to the specific terms of Facebook’s privacy policy—a 
complicated contract that few people have actually read. If 
Facebook’s duties were wholly based on the terms of the 
contract, then it could make those duties vanish simply by 
changing its privacy policy. Rather, these fiduciary 
obligations exist on top of the contractual rights of the 
parties.60 
Information fiduciaries have three basic duties: a duty 
of care, a duty of confidentiality, and a duty of loyalty.61 The 
duties of care and confidentiality require information 
fiduciaries to keep data secure and not to disclose it to third 
parties unless those third parties are equally trustworthy 
and agree to the same duties of care, confidentiality, and 
loyalty as the fiduciary.62 Thus, a digital company has a 
duty to protect its end-users not merely from its own 
actions, but also from the actions of those with whom it 
shares data. Fiduciary obligations “run with the data,” so 
that a digital company like Facebook has an obligation to 
ensure that whenever it allows another person or business 
to see, view, or employ Facebook’s end-users’ data, these 
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 60. See FRANKEL, supra note 58, at 42–45; Balkin, supra note 10, at 1207. 
 61. See Balkin, supra note10, at 1206–08; Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond 
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882 
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 62. Balkin, supra note 10, at 1220. 
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persons and businesses must take on the same duties of 
trust and non-manipulation that Facebook itself must take 
on.63 
Finally, the duty of loyalty means that an information 
fiduciary must not use data to advantage itself at the 
expense of its end-users, and it must proactively work to 
avoid creating and acting on conflicts of interest between 
itself and its end-users.64 What this means in practice will 
depend on the nature of the business.65 Social media, like 
many other digital companies, exchange free or heavily 
subsidized services for the right to match end-users with 
advertisers, including individually targeted ads. This in 
itself could give rise to a conflict of interest, and regularly 
has. But unless we are to outlaw all targeted 
advertisements to subsidize digital services (which I would 
oppose and might raise First Amendment concerns), the 
proper solution is to limit the ways that digital companies 
may use their customers’ data. The goal, in other words, is 
to ameliorate or forestall the conflict of interest by requiring 
companies to act in good faith, forbidding them from 
manipulating or harming their end-users to increase their 
profits, requiring them to vet and oversee contractual 
partners with whom they share data, and preventing them 
from giving access to third-parties who will manipulate or 
harm their end-users. 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal shows how these 
fiduciary obligations work in practice. Facebook failed at all 
three of them. It failed in its duties of care and 
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confidentiality because it did not vet its contractual 
partners carefully enough. It did not make sure that it 
shared end-user data only with trustworthy persons and 
companies, and it did not ensure that its partners agreed to 
the same duties of care, confidentiality and loyalty. It did 
not sufficiently oversee and audit what Kogan and 
Cambridge Analytica did with end-user data, and it did not 
take steps to keep them from violating the interests of its 
end-users for their own profit and advantage. Although 
Kogan passed himself off as only a non-profit researcher, 
Facebook made many similar arrangements with for-profit 
companies in which it took a share of revenues in exchange 
for data access. Thus, Facebook failed at its duty of loyalty 
because it allowed third-parties to manipulate its end-users 
in order to make more money for itself. Finally, when 
Facebook learned about Kogan and Cambridge Analytica’s 
behavior, it did not act quickly and effectively to claw back 
all of its end-user’s data to protect them from further 
breaches of data security and further manipulation. 
In short, the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
demonstrated most of the things that an information 
fiduciary should not do with its end-users’ data. That is 
what made it such a characteristic scandal of the Second 
Gilded Age. It exposed how the grand bargain of free 
services for data—the bargain that makes the digital public 
sphere possible—allows companies to betray the trust of the 
vast numbers of people who rely on these companies in 
their everyday lives. 
Because of the economic logic that underpins the digital 
public sphere, capitalism has created a new system of 
relationships between us and digital media companies. 
These relationships have created new forms of digital 
vulnerability, and therefore these relationships should be 
fiduciary relationships, relationships of trust. When 
companies breach such a relationship of trust, they are not 
protected by the First Amendment any more than doctors 
and lawyers are protected by the First Amendment when 
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they disclose sensitive information about their clients and 
patients.66 
I have given only a general introduction to the 
obligations of digital information fiduciaries, and there is 
much more that has to be worked out over time. There will 
also be close cases in which it is not clear whether a digital 
enterprise should be treated as an information fiduciary. To 
deal with this problem, Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard Law 
School and I have laid out a basic proposal for a Digital 
Millennium Privacy Act.67 The DMPA would propose a new 
grand bargain to protect digital privacy. It would grant 
companies a safe harbor from state privacy regulation if 
companies agree to take on the fiduciary duties of care, 
confidentiality, and loyalty toward their end-users. 
CONCLUSION 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal is evidence that there 
is something deeply wrong with the grand bargain that 
pays for freedom of expression in the Second Gilded Age. 
The point of the concept of information fiduciaries is to 
rewrite that bargain, and to place the political economy of 
digital speech in the Second Gilded Age on a fairer, more 
decent footing. 
The Second Gilded Age has produced vast fortunes, and 
some of the most powerful companies that have ever 
existed. But it has also given rise to a new class of 
fiduciaries: companies with obligations of trust and good 
faith to their end-users and to the public as a whole. 
As the First Gilded Age drew to a close near the end of 
the nineteenth century, things looked pretty grim for 
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American democracy. Government was essentially for sale. 
America was dominated by what Teddy Roosevelt called 
“the great malefactors of wealth.”68 Americans seemed 
locked into a political economy of ever increasing oligarchy 
and corruption. And if you had asked people about 
American politics in 1895, they might well have despaired 
about the future of American democracy. 
But we know what happened after that. There was a 
renaissance of reform and an era of gradual improvement of 
American democracy, not perfect in all respects, but 
certainly better than things stood at the end of the 
nineteenth century. That is the message that I want to 
leave you with. What we did once before, during the First 
Gilded Age at the end of the nineteenth century, we can do 
again, in the Second Gilded Age, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. It will require a refusal to settle for 
the status quo, and a belief in the long run success of 
democracy. It will require mobilization, it will require 
protest, and above all, it will require the long grind of 
politics. But it has been done before, and we can do it once 
again. 
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